This Brief of Amici Curiae, in support of Appellant, Manny Zarlengo, argues that children transferred to and prosecuted in the adult criminal division must be permitted to appeal their case where they identify constitutional deficiencies in their juvenile bindover proceedings. Ohio’s mandatory bindover provision requires youth who are 16 and 17 years old who have been charged with specific crimes to be transferred to adult court. Amici curiae urge the Ohio Supreme Court to reject the lower court’s ruling that children waive their right to appeal deficiencies in the bindover decision if they enter a guilty plea in adult court, and instead recognize the right to interlocutory and direct appeal. Amici curiae argue specifically that plea agreements are deeply ingrained within America’s criminal justice system and that pressures to plead guilty often trump factual innocence, which are uniquely exacerbated for bindover youth. To effectuate the state and federal constitutional rights of Ohio’s youth, the child must have the right to appeal, regardless of whether they resolved their case by entering a guilty plea or by going to trial.
State of Ohio v. Austin Fuell, Case No. 2021-0794
This Brief of Amici Curiae, in support of Appellant, Austin Fuell, argues that to effectuate the constitutional rights of Ohio’s youth, robust protections are needed before bindover to adult court and when sentencing a young person to life in adult prison. Ohio’s mandatory bindover provision requires youth who are 16 and 17 years old who have been charged with specific crimes to be transferred to adult court. Once transferred, the law requiring a 15-years-to-life sentence for murder precludes judges from considering youth as a mitigating factor, as the sentence is mandatory even for juveniles. Amici curiae argue specifically that: (1) transfer hearings require due process protections to ensure youth are protected from the harms of the adult system and to prevent racially disproportionate transfer; (2) Life sentences are likewise imposed in racially disproportionate ways, and thus must allow for judicial consideration of youth as a mitigating factor. Such safeguards can combat bias and other deficiencies that lead to racial disparities in transfer and life sentencing, and can ensure a more equitable system.
State of Ohio v. Chaz Bunch, Case No. 2021-0579
This Brief of Amici Curiae, in support of Appellant, Chaz Bunch, argues that Ohio’s mandatory bindover laws should be eliminated, preventing a child from being transferred to adult court without a finding that they are not amenable to treatment in juvenile court. Ohio’s mandatory bindover provision requires youth who are 16 and 17 years old who have been charged with specific crimes to be transferred to adult court. Amici curiae argue specifically that: (1) a mandatory bindover scheme that provides no opportunity for individualized consideration contravenes United States Supreme Court jurisprudence; (2) Ohio’s mandatory bindover scheme violates Due Process; (3) statutory mechanisms intended to reduce overreliance on mandatory bindover have not been successful; and (4) Black youth are disproportionately boundover, which exacerbates racial disparities within the justice system. Given the substantial evidence pointing to the harmful nature of mandatory bindover and the wide spread support for allowing juvenile court judges to decide whether a youth should be boundover on a case-by-case basis, the amici curiae request that the Supreme Court of Ohio recognize the mandatory bindover law as unconstitutional.
State of Ohio v. Donovan Nicholas, Reply Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant
State of Ohio v. Donovan Nicholas, Case No. 2020-1429
This Brief of Amici Curiae, in support of Appellant, Donovan Nicholas, argues that Ohio law presumes children remain in juvenile court, as opposed to adult court. Ohio’s discretionary bindover provision permits a juvenile court to transfer youth as young as 14 years old to the adult criminal system if the youth is found not amenable to juvenile rehabilitation. The amici brief argues specifically that: (1) the presumption that children remain in juvenile court requires the prosecutor seeking adult transfer to present evidence affirmatively demonstrating that the child is not amenable to juvenile jurisdiction, and (2) in determining whether to order transfer, the court may not use the child’s severe mental illness against him. Given the evidence demonstrating the array of harms associated with bindovers, to both the child and the community, the amici curiae urge the Ohio Supreme Court to establish a standard and burden in amenability proceedings that preserves the mission of the juvenile court to rehabilitate children.
State of Ohio v. Matthew Aalim, Case No. 2015-0677
This Brief of Amici Curiae, in support of the appellant, Matthew Aalim, argues that Ohio's mandatory bindover laws should be eliminated. Ohio’s mandatory bindover provision requires youth who are 16 and 17 years old who have been charged with specific crimes to be transferred to adult court. The amici brief specific argues that: (1) mandatory transfer of youth to adult court does not align with the original goal it was designed to address or the fundamental goals of the Ohio's juvenile court system; (2) the legislature’s attempt to reduce the number of mandatory bindovers through the implementation of Serious Youthful Offender and reverse waiver laws have proven to be unsuccessful; and (3) there is a broad body of support for the elimination of the mandatory bindover law from national and Ohio stakeholders including juvenile court stakeholders, county organizations, and national polls. Given the substantial evidence pointing to the harmful nature of mandatory bindover and the wide spread support for allowing juvenile court judges to decide whether a youth should be boundover on a case-by-case basis, the amici curiae request that the Supreme Court of Ohio recognize the mandatory bindover law as unconstitutional.
A.M. v. Ann Holmes, Case Nos. 14-2066; 14-2183
The majority opinion of the United State District Court of New Mexico allows for law enforcement officers to arrest schoolchildren for behavior that purportedly disrupts the classroom, even if that behavior is typical of children such as burping, laughing, or leaning into the classroom from the hallway. Slip Op. at 33. This Brief of Amici Curiae, submitted in support of the appellant, A.M., has three arguments: (1) criminalizing ordinary schoolchildren’s behavior contrasts with the school’s responsibility to help prepare students for citizenship in our democracy, (2) allowing school-based arrests for classroom misconduct criminalizes normal childish behavior with possible harmful results in regards to the child’s education, health, and life chances, and (3) endorsing law enforcement with near unlimited discretion to arrest children results in harms children who are most at risk. The amici request a rehearing of this cases by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, en banc.
J.B., a Minor v. James B. Fassnacht, et al., Case No. 15-903
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that under the Fourth Amendment strip searches of children should be governed by the same standard for adults set forth in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Cty. of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012), which in effect allows for a blanket strip-search policy in youth detention facilities. CLC joined J.B. v. James B. Fassnacht as amici curiae in support of the petitioner, J.B., a minor child. Amici urged the court to grant S.B.’s petition for a writ of certiorari, which challenged the widespread practice of blanket strip-searches of youth entering juvenile detention centers across the nation on the basis that the practice is uniquely harmful to children. Children and adolescents, who are still in the developmental stage, are significantly more likely than their adult counterparts to experience severe psychological trauma when subjected to strip searches. Given the practice's significant psychological impact, the amici argued that the balancing test for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment must be tailored specifically to children when considering the use of strip searches at juvenile detention centers. Furthermore, the amici concluded that through the already existing intake process officers can reasonably implement an individualized suspicion standard. Thus, the amici contended that the Court should grant J.B.’s petition and reverse the Third Circuit Court’s decision.
Henry Montgomery v. State of Louisiana, Case No. 14-280
In Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court of the United States held that mandatory sentences of life without the possibility of parole are unconstitutional for juvenile offenders, even those convicted of homicide offenses. The Court extended the rulings from Roper v. Simmons and Graham v. Florida that children are less culpable than adults for their actions. In 1963, Mr. Montgomery shot and killed a police officer in East Baton Rouge, Louisiana. After trial, Mr. Montgomery received a mandatory life without parole sentence and spent over fifty years incarcerated in the Louisiana Department of Corrections. As of 2016, he was sixty-nine years old and had missed the societal shift in Louisiana and the United States.
This amicus curiae asked the Court to retroactively apply the Miller decision to the case of Mr. Henry Montgomery. First, the amicus curiae argued that Miller constituted a conversion in jurisprudence for the punishment of children because previous thinking portrayed children that committed serious crimes as hopeless. Second, as a matter of equity, if the Court were to prevent lower courts from revisiting those children sentenced to life without parole the Miller decision would resemble nothing more than a half-truth. In short, a landmark case like Miller must be a turning point in criminal procedure. Therefore, Miller cannot be subjected to bars on retroactivity. Teague v. Lanes, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989).
In Re: D.M. Case No. 2013-0579
CLC joined In Re: D.M. as amici curiae in support of the appellant, a minor child, D.M. The State of Ohio originally filed an appeal in D.M.’s case after the trial court dismissed the case on the grounds that the state failed to comply with a discovery order. The state refused to provide copies of statements by victims or other witnesses to the alleged crime, which were contained in reports prepared per the normal police routine. The First District Court of Appeals held that the state was only required to provide discovery to a juvenile upon request only as it pertains to Brady materials in its possession or is evidence that the state intends to use at the probable-cause hearing. D.M. argues on appeal the Ohio Supreme Court that a juvenile is entitled to full discovery prior to a probable cause hearing held pursuant to O.R.C. 2152.12, the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 16, and Juvenile Rule 24.